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Abstract
Corruption is a social plague: gains accrue to small groups, while its costs are borne by
everyone. Significant variation in its level between and within countries suggests a relationship
between social structure and the prevalence of corruption, yet, large scale empirical studies thereof
have been missing due to lack of data. In this paper we relate the structural characteristics of social
capital of towns with corruption in their local governments. Using datasets from Hungary, we
quantify corruption risk by suppressed competition and lack of transparency in the town’s awarded
public contracts. We characterize social capital using social network data from a popular online
platform. Controlling for social, economic, and political factors, we find that settlements with
fragmented social networks, indicating an excess of bonding social capital have higher corruption
risk and towns with more diverse external connectivity, suggesting a surplus of bridging social
capital are less exposed to corruption. We interpret fragmentation as fostering in-group favoritism
and conformity, which increase corruption, while diversity facilitates impartiality in public life and
stifles corruption.
Introduction
Corruption is widely recognized to affect adversely social and economic outcomes of societies [39],
yet it is difficult to fight [40]. Though education and income seem to decrease corruption [25], it
persists even under highly developed, democratic conditions, however, showing significant regional
differences [11]. Researchers often relate corruption to social aspects of society such as segregation [2],
interpersonal trust [53], civic-mindedness [27], and community engagement [50]. These approaches
build on the insight that corruption is a collective outcome of a community shaped by the interactions
among individuals [46], suggesting that differences in the social capital, especially in the network
structure may help explain the persistence of corruption and the observed differences in its levels.
The concept of social capital, or the ”connections among individuals social networks and the norms
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” [50], is usually applied to understand behavior
of individuals [48]. Yet city or country-level aggregations have also proven useful [50], for example,
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in studying economic development and prosperity [62]. As a communal quantity, social capital is
a sort of public good embedded in a social network [35] of a settlement. It is therefore natural to
expect that the structure of social capital at settlement level has considerable impact on the scale of
corruption in that community. Despite significant interest in the network aspects of corruption [23]
and recent experimental evidence that corruption has collaborative roots [61], less is known about
how the patterns of connectivity of a whole society influences the general level of corruption in its
government.
Previous studies of relating social capital and corruption [29, 5] have been constrained by two
empirical challenges: the difficulty of measuring corruption and the lack of data on network structure
at the settlement level. Corruption is one of the most hidden type of crimes therefore it is difficult to
estimate its extent in general. Many studies measure corruption using national or regional surveys [40]
and suffer from the subjectivity of corruption perceptions [59]. Other studies use data on the frequency
of investigations and convictions of politicians [25], in which a source of bias may be that in places
where corruption is prevalent the judiciary is more likely to be corrupt itself. Recent efforts to clean
and standardize large datasets on public procurement [18] have been very helpful in this context as
their study can lead to new, more objective indicators of corruption risk.
In the absence of direct network data, researchers often quantify social capital using proxies such
as rates of voting, donating blood, and volunteering [27]. As these rates are themselves related to
the underlying social networks, they indicate rather the relevance of social capital instead of explain-
ing the causes of corruption in terms of network structure. Mapping out the social capital at the
level of settlements using traditional tools is a formidable task. Fortunately, recent developments in
information-communication technologies and their increasing popularity enable to access large data
sets containing relevant information in this respect. For example, data from online social networks and
cellphone records have been used to relate connectivity and socio-economic outcomes [15, 7, 38, 42, 4].
In this paper we propose to characterize the level of corruption risk in settlements in terms of
their social capital using two sources of micro-level data from Hungary. We quantify the structural
characteristics of towns’ social capital using complete data from “iWiW”, a now defunct online so-
cial network once used by approximately 40% of the adult Hungarian population [33]. We measure
corruption risk using administrative data on public procurement contracts [20].
Public procurement contracts constitute a major channel of public funds to private hands and
are highly vulnerable to corruption [18]. Recently, a set of corruption risk indicators have been
derived from public contract data, for example, if the contract attracted a single bidder only. These
contract-based corruption risk measures are significantly related to other proxies of corruption. When
aggregated at the regional and national levels, they have been shown to correlate significantly with
corruption perception surveys [18] and quality of government indicators [12]. In the Hungarian case,
we find that a group of settlements involved in a recent corruption scandal [17] have significantly
higher corruption risk in their contracts.
Putnam distinguishes between two structural categories of social capital: bonding and bridging
social capital [50] and we expect that these have different impacts on corruption risk. Bonding social
capital is based on the phenomenon of closure in a social network, describing the extent to which people
form dense, homogeneous groups. Such groups have benefits: members share high levels of trust and
can count on each other in times of crisis. They can also be sure that members who defy the norms
of the group will be censured. The homogeneity of such tight-knit groups is often based on ethnicity,
religion, or class [13] indicating possible drawbacks: homogeneity facilitates conformity and implies
exclusion of outsider groups. Solidarity can reach the extent that members of the group will protect
each other even if norms outside the group are broken, in some cases even if crimes are committed.
Sophisticated criminal organizations like the Mafia, members of which may regularly be faced with
great incentives to “flip”, rely on bonding rituals, ethnic homogeneity, and family ties to enforce
solidarity and in-group trust [16, 23]. The negative effects of excessive bonding social capital on society
are not limited to crime and corruption. Entrepreneurs embedded in dense networks are disadvantaged
because of pressure to employ under-qualified relatives [24], while ethnically homogeneous groups of
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traders are more likely to mis-price financial assets in the same direction and create bubbles [34].
Bridging social capital, on the other hand, refers to the connections in a community between people
from different social groups. Such ties are valuable for their ability to convey novel information [26]
and exposure to diverse perspectives, though they do not serve as strong conduits of trust. Previous
work shows, for instance, that immigrants in the Netherlands with bridging connections outside their
ethnic group have significantly higher incomes and employment rates [31]. But bridging social capital
is not only thought to be useful for the resources it allocates. Using an agent-based model, Macy
and Skvoretz showed how trust emerged among densely connected neighbors and diffused in a social
network via weak ties [37], implying that low bridging social capital restricted trust to within-group
interactions. Indeed, empirical evidence showed that ethnic groups in diverse communities with more
bridging social capital evaluate each other more positively [32].
We pose two hypotheses relating bonding and bridging social capital to local corruption risk. The
first (H1) is that excess bonding social capital in a town enables corruption in its government by
fostering norms of in-group favoritism thus it increases corruption risk. The second (H2) is that
surplus bridging capital, including connections to other towns, suppresses corruption by fostering
impersonal and universalistic norms, thus it decreases corruption risk. The two hypotheses mirror,
quoting Portes, “Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical solidarity, based on social homogeneity
and tight personal bonds, and organic solidarity, based on role differentiation, impersonal norms, and
an extensive division of labor.” [49]. Where mechanical solidarity or bonding social capital dominate
organic solidarity or bridging social capital, universalistic norms under which public markets are
thought to function best are unsustainable. These hypotheses suggest why corruption is so difficult
to fight: it is embedded in the social network of a place.
Previous work using survey data is in accord with our hypotheses. Harris finds a significant positive
relationship between excess bonding social capital, measured using surveys, and corruption across over
200 countries [29]. In a comparative study of the 50 US states, Knack finds that residents in states
with higher census response and volunteering rate their governments’ performances more highly [30].
He finds no such effect for rates of membership in social clubs, a more exclusive form of socialization
than volunteering. Paccagnella and Sestito find that in regions with high electoral turnout and blood
donation rates, Italian schoolchildren cheat less frequently on standardized tests. In schools with
greater ethnic homogeneity and with hometown teachers, cheating is more frequent [45]. These case
studies and indirect evidences give some support the above hypotheses, however, there is need for
studies based on more direct data.
We find significant evidence for our hypotheses using multivariate regression models to relate
corruption risk and structural aspects of social capital. Hungarian settlements with fragmented social
networks, which we interpret as evidence of excess bonding social capital, have higher corruption risk
in their public procurement contracts. On the other hand, if the typical resident of a settlement has
more diverse connections especially over the boundaries of their own towns, then the local corruption
risk is lower. These results hold controlling for several potential confounders including economic
prosperity, education, demographics, and political competitiveness.
Empirical Setting and Methods
Public contracting
In OECD economies procurement counts typically between 10 to 20% of GDP [44] covering everything
from school lunches to hospital beds and highway construction. The complexity of the contracts
and the relative inelasticity of the government’s demand for goods make them a prime target for
corruption [51].
Contracts are supposed to be awarded using impartial market mechanisms [60]: open and fair
competition for a contract is considered the best way to insure that the government makes purchases
of good quality at the lowest cost. Usually, an issuer of a contract publishes a call for bids from
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Indicator and Symbol Values Indicator Definition
Single bidder
Csinglebid
{0, 1} 1 if a single firm submits an offer.
Closed procedure
Cclosedproc
{0, 1} 1 if the contract was awarded directly to a firm or
by invite-only competition.
No call for bids
Cnocall
{0, 1} 1 if no call for bids was published in the official
procurement journal.
Long eligibility criteria
Celigcrit
{0, 1} 1 if the length in characters of the firm eligibility
criteria is above the market average1.
Extreme decision period
Cdecidetime
{0, 1} 1 if the award was made within 5 days of the dead-
line or more than 100 days following.
Short time to submit bids
Cbidtime
{0, .5, 1} 1 if the number of days between the call and sub-
mission deadline is less than 5, 0.5 if between 5 and
15.
Non-price criteria
Cnonprice
{0, 1} 1 if non-price criteria are used to evaluate bids.
Call for bids modified
Ccallmod
{0, 1} 1 if the call for bids was modified.
Table 1: Elementary indicators of public contract corruption risk.
the private sector, setting a deadline for submissions leaving enough time for broad participation.
Companies submit sealed offers, including a price. The company offering to provide the good or
service for the lowest price, meeting the standards set in the call for bids, wins the contract.
Measuring settlement corruption risk in contracting
Corruption in public contracting typically involves the restriction of competition. If corrupt bu-
reaucrats wish to award a contract to a favored firm, they must somehow exclude other firms from
participating in the competition for the contract. We quantify this phenomenon at the contract level
by tracking the presence of elementary corruption indicators, signals we can extract from metadata
suggesting that competition may have been curbed [18]. These quantitative indicators, deduced [20]
from qualitative work on corruption in public contracting, are the fingerprints of techniques used
to steer contracts towards preferred firms. We consider eight such elementary indicators, defined in
Table 1.
From these eight elementary indicators we define two measures of contract corruption risk:
Closed procedure or single bidding (Ccsb): Did the contract attract only a single bid or was the
contract awarded by some procedure besides an open call for bids, for example by direct negotiation
with a firm or by an invitation-only auction? In terms of the indicators defined above:
Ccsb = max(Csinglebid, Cclosedproc)
Corruption Risk Index (CRI): Following [20], we average all eight elementary indicators defined
in Table 1 for each contract:
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Figure 1: Distributions of average contract corruption risk indicators across Hungarian settlements.
CRI =
1
8
(Csinglebid + Cclosedproc + Cnocall + Celigcrit + Cbidtime + Cnonprice + Ccallmod + Cdecidetime)
Such indicator-based measures of corruption risk have been related to traditional measures of
corruption at the regional and national levels. Among EU countries, similar indicators are highly cor-
related with both the World Bank’s Control of Corruption rankings and Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index [18]. They also predict cost overruns and price inflation in European
infrastructure projects [19]. At the micro-level, public bodies issuing high corruption risk contracts are
significantly more likely to award contracts to new companies after a change in government [21]. Fi-
nally, evidence from the US suggests that firms making campaign contributions are awarded contracts
with higher corruption risk [22].
Local Government Contracting Data
We examine 20,524 municipal government contracts from the period of 2006-2014 issued by Hungarian
settlements awarding at least five contracts a year on average. There are 169 settlements in Hungary
meeting this criterion, excluding Budapest2. We average both corruption risk indicators over all
contracts issued by a town to arrive at its rate of issuing closed procedure or single-bid contracts and
its average CRI.
We plot the distributions of the settlement corruption risk scores in Figure 1. We note that there
is substantial variation across settlements: some award over 90% of their contracts either via a closed
procedure or to a single bidding supplier, while others do so less than 25% of the time.
As a test of the validity of our settlement-level measures of corruption risk, we check them against
a near-ground truth case of corruption. In 2018, OLAF, the European anti-fraud agency reported that
35 Hungarian local government public lighting contracts awarded between 2010 and 2014 contained
“serious irregularities” [17, 43]. Elios, the company winning these contracts, was owned at that time
by the son-in-law of the Hungarian Prime Minister. The contracts are considered to be overpriced and
the Hungarian government was appealed for initiating an investigation, which has already started.
2Budapest, the capital of Hungary, is an order of magnitude larger than the second largest settlement and has a
unique governance structure.
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Figure 2: Distributions of average contract corruption risk indicators for settlements involved in
the Elios scandal compared with all other settlements. Settlements involved in the scandal have
significantly higher average corruption risk in their contracting than their counterparts.
These cases provide a useful test of our corruption risk indicators. There is compelling evidence
that settlements implicated in the scandal have, at least once, rigged a public procurement contract
to favor a connected firm. We compare the average corruption risk indicators of the 35 towns that
awarded lighting contracts to Elios in the period in question with all other towns in our sample in
Figure 2. Using a Mann-Whitney U-test, we find that towns involved in the scandal have significantly
higher rates of corruption risk according to both measures (64% vs 58% Ccsb rate, U = 1385, p¡.033;
.30 vs .28 average CRI, U = 1397, p=.037).
Measuring social capital
iWiW was popular online social network operating in Hungary from 2004 to 2013. At its peak it
boasted over 3.5 million active users (out of a population of around 10 million) and was among the
top 3 most visited sites in the country. After a period of sustained popularity, it finally collapsed in
2013 as competitors, including Facebook, conquered the market. The increasing tendency of users to
leave led to cascades of churners, highlighting the networked nature of the site [57, 36]. Geographic
distance is a major predictor of the likelihood of friendship ties on iWiW, and connections between
towns reflect historical administrative boundaries and geographical barriers [33]. We use data from
iWiW and measures based on its network of friendships to quantify bonding and bridging social capital
in Hungarian settlements.
The iWiW network consists of users as nodes and mutually acknowledged friendship ties between
users as links. Data from iWiW includes information on each user’s town, selected from a menu. We
used an anonymized version of the data to insure privacy. We describe steps we took to clean the
network and the distribution of use rates at the settlement level in the SI.
Despite valid concerns about the representativity of data taken from online social networks [58],
studies indicate data from online social networks offer a useful picture of the social capital of their
users [63, 9]. As adoption of online social networks increases, they become increasingly useful for the
study of the social structures [14]. In any case, we control for possible confounding factors including
settlement average income, rate of iWiW use, and share of the population over 60 in our models.
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Fragmentation
Our first settlement-level network measure, fragmentation, quantifies the extent to which people in
the settlement form densely connected and well separated subgroups. We do not consider the links
residents of a settlement have with other towns. Fragmentation measures a settlement’s bonding social
capital.
We measure fragmentation of the settlement’s internal social network using a community detection
method to identify groups of highly connected nodes. We use the Louvain algorithm [6], a popular
and efficient method leading to a partition of the network. We measure the quality of the partition,
the tendency of edges to be within rather than between the detected groups, using modularity [41].
Given a social network of users in a settlement S and a partition of the network’s nodes into K groups,
the modularity Q(S) of the partition of the network can be written as:
Q(S) =
K∑
k=1
[Lwk
L
−
(Lk
L
)2]
,
where L is the total number of edges in the considered network, Lk is the number of edges adjacent
to members of group k, and Lwk is the number of edges within group k.
As modularity is highly dependent on the size and density of the network [55], we scale each
settlement’s modularity score in order to make valid comparisons between the towns. Following Sah
et al. [54], we divide each settlement’s modularity score by the theoretical maximum modularity
Qmax(S) that the given partition could achieve, namely if all edges were within groups.
Qmax(S) =
K∑
k=1
[Lk
L
−
(Lk
L
)2]
.
We then define the fragmentation FS of a settlement S as the quotient
FS = Q(S)/Qmax(S). (1)
Fragmentation measures the tendency of individuals to belong to distinct groups within a settlement.
A fragmented settlement consists of tightly-knit groups that are weakly connected. Both the excess of
connections within and the rarity of connections between groups in fragmented networks are relevant
to our theoretical framing of the origins of corruption as they indicate excess bonding social capital.
The high density of connections within a group facilitates the enforcement of reciprocity, while having
few connections between groups fosters particularism.
To better understand the concept of fragmentation, we compare two settlements, one at the 90th
percentile of fragmentation (town A) and the other at the 10th percentile (town B). The two towns
have populations of roughly 10,000 and have iWiW user rates between 30 and 35%. We randomly
sample 300 users from both social networks for the sake of visualization and plot their connections in
Figure 3. Town A is clearly more fragmented than town B. We also show the full adjacency matrices
of the networks of these settlements, grouping nodes by their detected communities into blocks on
the diagonal shaded in red. We label each community by the share of its edges staying within the
community. The fragmented settlement has a clear over-representation of within-community edges.
Diversity
Past research on online social networks noted that users connect with a variety of groups from their
life-course [9]. For example a user may connect with her schoolmates, university classmates, coworkers,
family, and friends from environments including social clubs, sports teams, or religious communities.
We measure the diversity of an individual user’s network by the (lack of) overlap between these groups.
In this case, we do not restrict our attention to edges between users from the same town.
Following Brooks et al. [9], we consider the connections amongst the friends of a focal user or ego,
i.e. the ego network without the ego. We then detect communities in the resulting network using the
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Figure 3: Sampled social networks and adjacency matrices of high (A) and low (B) fragmentation
settlements. Node colors indicate membership in communities. In the adjacency matrices, percentages
indicate the share edges staying within each community. In the fragmented settlement, communities
have a significantly fewer connections with other communities.
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Figure 4: Ego networks with low (A) and high (B) diversity, respectively. Colors indicate membership
in detected communities in the ego network. Circles denote users from the same settlement as the
ego, while triangles mark users from elsewhere. The high diversity user’s network has clusters of alters
mostly from different towns.
Louvain algorithm [6]. We can assume that members of a community of alters share some common
context. We measure the separation of these communities of alters using modularity. Low modularity
indicates that a user’s connections tend to know each other, and that the user’s different spheres of life
involve the same people. High modularity indicates that the ego has a bridging role between weakly
connected communities, and so we refer to such users as having high diversity in their social networks.
We show examples of low and high diversity users with networks of similar sizes in Figure 4.
We aggregate this user level measure to a measure of settlement diversity DS by averaging each
user’s modularity score:
DS =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
Q({altersi}),
where |S| is the number of nodes in the settlement S and {altersi} is the subgraph of the alters of
node i ∈ S. This measure captures the typical diversity of social perspectives that the members of
the town access. At the settlement level this measure captures bridging social capital.
Settlement diversity is positively correlated with share of the population graduating from high
school (ρ ≈ 0.62) and average income (ρ ≈ 0.55). Fragmentation and diversity are positively correlated
(ρ ≈ 0.46), which is not surprising given that both are calculated using network modularity. However,
the ego-focus and, more importantly, the inclusion of inter-settlement edges of the diversity measure
distinguish it from fragmentation, see the SI. Despite this correlation, we observe that they predict
different corruption outcomes.
Models
The primary aim of our paper is to relate bonding and bridging social capital in settlements to
corruption risk in their public contracts. Our hypothesis H1 is related to excess bonding social capital,
measured by fragmentation while hypothesis H2 refers surplus in bridging social capital, measured by
diversity. We predict average contract corruption risk at the settlement level using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) multiple regressions of the following form:
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Dependent variable: % Closed or single bid. Average CRI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation 0.263∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗
(Bonding social capital) (0.097) (0.092)
Diversity −0.553∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(Bridging social capital) (0.176) (0.168)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.245 1.206 2.779 2.790
Observations 169 169 169 169
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.230 0.183 0.243
F Statistic 3.967∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗ 4.419∗∗∗ 5.142∗∗∗
Table 2: Town-level regression results predicting two corruption risk indicators. For both dependent
variables, the first columns (1) and (3) correspond to the base model, predicting corruption risk using
only control variables, and the second columns (2) and (4) show results, when the social network
features are included. Note that all features are standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Full model tables are presented in the SI. Significance thresholds: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
CS = β1 ∗ FS + β2 ∗DS +XS ∗ θ + S
Where CS is one of two corruption risk indicators, averaged at the settlement level, FS is the
settlement’s fragmentation, DS is the settlement’s diversity, XS is a matrix of control variables defined
below, and S is an error term. The β-s are scalar and θ a vector of unknown parameters.
We include a variety of control variables in our regressions. Past research has found significant
relationships between wealth, education, employment and corruption [40] so we control for settlement
average income, its share of high school graduates, the presence of a university in the town, and
its unemployment and inactivity rates. As demographic features of settlements may influence the
measured social network we include total population, rate of iWiW use, and share of the population
over 60 in our models [47]. We also control for the settlement’s mayor’s average victory margin in the
2002, 2006, 2010 elections as a proxy for the level of political competition in the town [8]. Finally,
we include a geographic feature of the settlements: the minimum travel distance in minutes from the
capital, Budapest. For the sake of comparison we fit a baseline models including only the control
terms.
Results
We summarize our findings in Table 2. We see that there is a significant relationship between social
network structure and both dependent variables measuring corruption. More fragmentation consis-
tently predicts more corruption, while more diversity consistently predicts less corruption. In both
cases adding the network features significantly improves the adjusted R2 of the model. Moreover,
comparing the coefficients, we see that the social network features have effect sizes comparable to
that of any social, political, or economic control. We present the full models in the SI, including the
intermediate models containing only one network feature. All models pass a variance inflation factor
(VIF) test for feature collinearity, see the SI.
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Figure 5: Plots of marginal effects of the key social capital variables and their predicted impact on a
settlement’s rate of closed procedure or single bidder contract awards; shaded regions represent 90%
confidence intervals are indicated. As the variables are standardized, unit changes on either axis can
be interpreted as standard deviation changes. Fragmentation (on the left), quantifying excess bonding
social capital in a community, predicts higher corruption risk, while diversity (on the right) predicts
lower corruption risk.
We visualize the effects of our network variables in Figure 5. We plot model predicted rate of
closed procedure or single bid contract awards (Ccsb) including 90% confidence intervals for varying
levels of fragmentation and average ego diversity. As the variables are standardized, the units can
be interpreted as standard deviations from the mean (at 0). We observe that, all else equal, our
model predicts that going from one standard deviation below average fragmentation to one standard
deviation above average, increases Ccsb by about one half of a standard deviation. Diversity has a
stronger effect in the other direction: the same change (from one standard deviation below average to
one above average) induces a full standard deviation decrease in the corruption indicator. The effect
of the network features on CCRI is similar. In the SI, we present an ANOVA feature importance test
that indicates the significance of both network-based features.
Discussion
In this paper we used data from an online social network and a collection of public procurement
contracts to relate the social capital of Hungarian settlements to the corruption in its local government.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study social aspects of corruption using large-scale social
network data.
We introduced measures to quantify excess bonding and bridging social capital at the settlement
level from online social network data. We found that settlements with high bonding social capital tend
to award contracts with higher corruption risk. We also found that settlements with high bridging
social capital, tend to award lower corruption risk contracts. Social capital measures add substantive
predictive power to models of corruption outcomes, above baseline models controlling for other socio-
11
economic factors such as average income, education, political competition, and demography.
We recognize several limitations to our approach. An inherent challenge in the research of corrup-
tion is that proven cases are rare, and so our measures can only track risk or suspicion of corruption.
Moreover, we assume that steering contracts to certain firms by bureaucrats indicates corruption - but
it may happen that bureaucrats make socially optimal decisions using their local knowledge of markets
and discretion. iWiW is not a full map of social relations in Hungary and its users do not make up a
representative sample of the population. Finally, we do not claim to have found a causal link between
social capital and corruption risk. Besides the potential of omitted variable bias, corruption can also
influence social capital [52].
Despite these limitations we believe that our findings are valuable. Above all, our novel, data-
based, town-level approach provides new evidence for the old hypothesis that corruption is a structural
phenomenon. This explains why appointing an ombudsman in a corrupt place rarely improves cor-
ruption outcomes [40] and why anti-corruption laws can backfire if they conflict with prevailing social
norms [1].
That is not to say that fighting corruption is futile. Rather we believe our findings suggest that
top-down efforts are unlikely to work unless they impact social capital or other significant covariates
of our model like political competition. Our conclusions hint at potential mechanisms which sustain
corruption. Factors such as racial segregation or economic inequality which may drive fragmentation
are ideal targets for policy interventions [53].
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1 Supplementary Information
1.1 Description of iWiW data
In line with previous work on iWiW we filtered the data used in our analysis. Out of roughly 4.5
million user accounts, we dropped the roughly 500,000 accounts with location outside of Hungary.
We also dropped the 193 users with more than 10,000 connections, arguing that such a large number
of connections cannot represent social ties. In Figure 6 we show the relationship between settlement
population and the number of iWiW users listing their location in the settlement, and the share of
the population registered to iWiW.
1.2 Relationship between fragmentation and diversity
Fragmentation and diversity, our measures of bonding and bridging social capital respectively, are
positively and significantly correlated (ρ ≈ 0.46). Though fragmentation considers only edges within
the settlement and ego diversity includes external edges, both variables measure modularity in the
network. However, according to our hypotheses, they are expected to capture different kinds of so-
cialization. We found that despite their positive correlation these features have opposite relationships
with our corruption risk measures: high fragmentation is positively and high diversity is negatively
correlated with corruption risk. To test whether inter-settlement edges or the ego focus of diversity
does more to distinguish the measure from fragmentation we recalculated the diversity considering
only edges within the settlement. This alternative “internal” diversity measure is weakly correlated
(ρ ≈ 0.28) with fragmentation, and strongly correlated with diversity (ρ ≈ 0.72). This suggests that
both the connections to other towns and the ego-focus of the diversity measure distinguish fragmented
towns from diverse ones.
1.3 Model covariates and controls
In this appendix section we present the settlement-level variables used as controls in our models. We
also report their summary statistics. Note that in our models, we scale all features to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1.
• Average income per capita: Wealthier places tend to be less corrupt [40] as competition for
limited resources is expected to create greater incentive to cheat.
• Population (log): Larger cities may have different contracting needs, different political and social
norms, and different network characteristics.
• Number of contracts awarded (log): Settlements contracting more frequently may be more expe-
rienced and may follow better practices. As larger groups of people are involved in contracting,
corruption may become more difficult.
• Rate of iWiW use: The rate of iWiW use both proxies for the economic development of the
settlement and controls for differences in observed social network structure resulting from dif-
ferences in access to the web.
• Average mayoral victory margin: Measured across three elections (2002, 2006, 2010), this vari-
able proxies for the lack of political competition in the settlement. The absence of political
competition has been shown to correlate with corruption [8].
• Share of population with at least a high school diploma: Education is typically correlated with
better control of corruption [53].
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Closed procedure or single bidder 169 0.59 0.15 0.21 0.92
Average CRI 169 0.28 0.04 0.16 0.40
Fragmentation 169 0.32 0.04 0.16 0.46
Avg. ego diversity 169 0.35 0.07 0.20 0.51
Income per capita (thousands HUF) 169 823.57 189.93 488.44 1,516.55
N contracts (log) 169 4.52 0.69 3.69 6.42
Population (log) 169 9.72 0.89 7.66 12.24
Rate iWiW use 169 0.33 0.06 0.18 0.46
Average mayoral victory margin 169 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.64
% high school graduates 169 47.23 10.22 25.70 76.80
Distance to Budapest (minutes) 169 114.00 54.34 22.55 228.57
Share of population inactive 169 0.30 0.04 0.20 0.40
Unemployment Rate 169 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.09
Share of population 60+ 169 0.24 0.03 0.15 0.39
Has university 169 0.25 0.44 0 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of key settlement-level variables and controls.
• Share of working-age population inactive and unemployment rate: Counting the long-term and
short-term unemployed respectively, these variables quantify economic stagnation. The economic
hardship connected with high unemployment is conjectured to worsen political corruption [56].
• The minimum travel distance to Budapest, the capital city : This variable captures the physical
isolation of the settlement from the main economic, political, and social hub of the country. Past
research has shown that geographic isolation reduces accountability and increases corruption [10].
• Share of population over 60 years old : This variable controls for the over-representation of
the elderly. The elderly are underrepresented on online social networks and tend to use these
platforms differently than younger users [47].
• Whether the settlement has a university : This variable controls for the presence of a place
of higher education in the settlement, including local branches of universities headquartered
elsewhere. this which inflates the number of young people, hence likely iWiW users in the town.
1.4 Model results, diagnostics, and feature importances
We present the full model results in Table 4. Note that all variables are standardized with mean 0
and standard deviation 1. This aids interpretation, for example: a one standard deviation increase in
the settlement’s mayor’s average margin of victory increases corruption risk by roughly one quarter
of a standard deviation. We also present models including only one of the two network measures in
Table 5. The effect and significance of both features is preserved when the other is excluded.
The estimated coefficients of the control variables and their levels of statistical significance offer
additional insight into the phenomenon of corruption risk. Wealthier settlements are in general less
corrupt, though the effect is not significant for CRI. Rate of iWiW use is not related with corruption
risk and this does not change when we include the social capital features. The average mayoral victory
margin is a highly significant positive predictor of corruption risk. One potential explanation is that
mayors, who do not face significant competition do not fear being voted out of office if they are
corrupt. Similarly towns that are far from Budapest, which our models predict to be significantly
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Dependent variable: % Closed or single bid. Average CRI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation 0.263∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗
(Bonding social capital) (0.097) (0.092)
Diversity −0.553∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(Bridging social capital) (0.176) (0.168)
Income/capita −0.262 −0.277∗ −0.075 −0.096
(0.169) (0.162) (0.161) (0.155)
N contracts (log) −0.313∗ −0.314∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.165) (0.162) (0.158)
Population (log) −0.180 0.020 0.118 0.335∗∗
(0.143) (0.166) (0.136) (0.159)
Rate iWiW use 0.045 0.037 0.122 0.107
(0.137) (0.132) (0.130) (0.126)
Mayor victory margin 0.278∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.086) (0.085) (0.082)
% high school grads 0.166 0.374∗ −0.176 0.040
(0.190) (0.199) (0.181) (0.190)
Distance to Budapest −0.021 −0.198∗ 0.061 −0.112
(0.104) (0.112) (0.099) (0.107)
Share of pop. inactive −0.797∗∗∗ −0.805∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗ −0.754∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.229) (0.218) (0.219)
Unemployment Rate 0.239∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.113) (0.112) (0.108)
% population 60+ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.158) (0.155) (0.151)
Has university 0.351 0.294 0.431∗∗ 0.352∗
(0.220) (0.221) (0.210) (0.211)
Constant 1.245∗ 1.206∗ 2.779∗∗∗ 2.790∗∗∗
(0.725) (0.702) (0.689) (0.671)
Observations 169 169 169 169
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.230 0.183 0.243
F Statistic 3.967∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗ 4.419∗∗∗ 5.142∗∗∗
Table 4: Town-level regression results predicting two corruption risk indicators. For both dependent
variables, the first columns (1) and (3) correspond to the base model, predicting corruption risk using
only control variables, and the second columns (2) and (4) show results, when the social network
features are included. Note that all features are standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Significance thresholds: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Dependent variable: % Closed or single bid.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fragmentation 0.233∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(Bonding social capital) (0.099) (0.097)
Diversity −0.505∗∗∗ −0.553∗∗∗
(Bridging social capital) (0.179) (0.176)
Income/capita −0.262 −0.295∗ −0.243 −0.277∗
(0.169) (0.166) (0.167) (0.162)
N contracts (log) −0.313∗ −0.359∗∗ −0.269 −0.314∗
(0.171) (0.168) (0.169) (0.165)
Population (log) −0.180 0.083 −0.257∗ 0.020
(0.143) (0.168) (0.144) (0.166)
Rate iWiW use 0.045 0.009 0.073 0.037
(0.137) (0.134) (0.135) (0.132)
Mayor victory margin 0.278∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.086)
% high school grads 0.166 0.397∗ 0.126 0.374∗
(0.190) (0.203) (0.188) (0.199)
Distance to Budapest −0.021 −0.169 −0.035 −0.198∗
(0.104) (0.114) (0.102) (0.112)
Share of pop. inactive −0.797∗∗∗ −0.931∗∗∗ −0.675∗∗∗ −0.805∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.229) (0.232) (0.229)
Unemployment Rate 0.239∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.262∗∗
(0.118) (0.115) (0.116) (0.113)
% population 60+ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.160) (0.162) (0.158)
Has University 0.351 0.198 0.449∗∗ 0.294
(0.220) (0.222) (0.221) (0.221)
Constant 1.245∗ 1.426∗∗ 1.036 1.206∗
(0.725) (0.712) (0.720) (0.702)
Observations 169 169 169 169
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.198 0.186 0.230
F Statistic 3.967∗∗∗ 4.460∗∗∗ 4.207∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗
Table 5: Stepwise regressions. The effect and significance of the network features are preserved when
including them only one at a time. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Predictor VIF
Fragmentation 1.407
Diversity 6.337
Income/capita 5.430
N contracts (log) 3.045
Population (log) 5.892
Rate iWiW use 2.885
Mayor victory margin 1.040
% high school grads 7.106
Share of pop. inactive 9.899
Unemployment Rate 2.360
Distance to Budapest 3.068
% population 60+ 5.442
Has university 2.192
Table 6: VIF scores for model predictors.
more corrupt, may be insulated from investigation by the central authorities simply by being out of
the spotlight.
One potential source of bias in the coefficient estimates of multiple regression models is collinearity
among the predictors. We test for multi-collinearity for each predictor using a variance inflation factor
(VIF) test, defined as the ratio of variance in the full model over the variance of the single-predictor
model. We run this diagnostic for each predictor used in models (2) and (4) in the main text and
report the results in Table 1.4. A popular rule of thumb is that VIF values under 10 denote acceptable
levels of correlation between variables [28].
We show the relative variable importances of Model (6) (column 6 in Table 2), the fully specific
model predicting average CRI, using an Analysis of Variance F-test in Figure 7. We include only
terms with a significant ANOVA F-test. Though other features have stronger predictive power, the
social network features are more useful in predicting corruption risk than economic variables like
unemployment, inactivity, and average income.
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Figure 6: A) Settlement population and number of iWiW users plotted on a log-log scale. B) iWiW
use rate by town.
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N contracts (log)
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Distance to Budapest (mins)
Share of population inactive Network Features
Figure 7: Analysis of Variance F-test feature importances of OLS regression predicting average set-
tlement CRI. We only include significant features, and highlight the network-based social capital
measures.
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